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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE RIGHT TO DEFEND PRO SE-FARETTA v.
CALIFORNIA: DUE PROCESS AND BEYOND

I.

INTRODUCTION

In comparatively recent years, judicial review in the realm of
criminal procedure has increasingly focused upon the constitutional
right to "assistance of counsel" conferred upon the criminally accused.
This focus inevitably culminated in United States Supreme Court decla-

rations that the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
guarantee that a criminal defendant be afforded the right to counsel
before he can be validly convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.' Now

that the constitutional mandates of the right to counsel have been
extended beyond felonies to all cases where the accused may be impris-

oned, 2 attention has been directed toward the pro se defendant. 3
The Federal Constitution expressly provides in the sixth amend-

ment that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence," but does not expressly provide individuals with the right to proceed in propria persona.4 Traditionally, the
1. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,
54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Grano]; Note, Criminal Defendants
at the Bar of Their Own Defense, 13 AM. Cms. L REv. 335 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Criminal Defendants at the Bar]; Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal Trials:
The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALEF. L. REv. 1479 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Self-Representation in Criminal Trials]; Comment, The Right to Appear Pro Se:
The Constitution and the Courts, 64 J. CnRm. L.C. & P.S. 240 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as The Right to Appear]; Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel,
49 MwIN. L. REV. 1133 (1965) [hereinafter cited as The Right of an Accused];
Comment, The Right to Defend Pro Se in CriminalProceedings, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 679
(1973) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Defend].
4. In propriapersona is defined literally as [Iln one's own proper person," while
pro se simply means "[flor himself; in his own behalf; in person." BLAC'S LAW
DrcnoNARY 899, 1364 (4th rev. ed. 1968). For the purposes of this comment, the terms
pro se and in propria persona will be synonymously used to denote the procedure through
which a criminal defendant represents himself at trial.
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Supreme Court has recognized the right of a defendant to waive counsel
if such waiver is "competently and intelligently made."' In Johnson v.
Zerbst,0 the Court stated: "The Sixth Amendment withholds from
federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to
deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
7
assistance of counsel.'
But to conclude that a trial is valid where there is a knowing and
intelligent waiver is not to say that the accused possesses a constitutional
right to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Indeed, it has been the
Court's rationale in the right-to-counsel cases-that the guarantee of
counsel is "necessary to insure the fundamental human rights of life and
liberty" s and is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial"A-that has
been subsequently employed to severely curtail the right to proceed pro
se and in some cases to force counsel upon the accused against his
wishes. 10 The Second Circuit in 1964 accurately perceived the developing constitutional quagmire in noting that in many cases the denial of the
pro se defense would not have occurred had the courts not become accustomed to assigning "Illegal Aid counsel and other lawyers" to criminal indigents with no means of retaining counsel of their choice."
In view of the fundamental status accorded the right to counsel in
the aforementioned cases, the right to proceed in propriapersona and its
precise nature have been inadvertently elevated to significance. It is
within the foregoing context that the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to Farettav. California,'2 the facts of which appear below.
Petitioner Faretta was charged with grand theft' 3 in an information
filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. Although the public defender was initially appointed to represent Faretta,
an indigent, Faretta subsequently requested well before the date of trial
that he be permitted to proceed without counsel. Inquiries by the trial
court elicited that petitioner had previously represented himself, 1 4 that
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708 (1948) (plurality opinion).
6. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7. Id. at 463.
8. Id. at 462.
9. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
10. See, e.g., Tuelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965); People v. Sharp,
7 Cal. 3d 448, 449 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944
(1973). See generally Grano, supra note 3, at 1198-1203.
11. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
12. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
13. CAL. PENAL Coun § 487 (West 1970).
14. The record indicated that Faretta had successfully negotiated a plea bargain
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he possessed a high school education, and that although he recognized
that the public defender's office was capable of furnishing "equal protection," he believed it to be" 'very loaded down with. . . a heavy case
load.' "16 The trial court responded that in its view Faretta was "making a mistake" and that in all further proceedings he would be treated
"like a lawyer" and would receive no special favors. 16 After establishing on the record that Faretta desired to proceed without counsel, the
court made a "preliminary ruling" accepting Faretta's waiver of assistance of counsel and granting him the right to proceed pro se. The
court, however, reserved the right to revoke its ruling if at any time it

became apparent that petitioner was unable to adequately represent
himself.
Several weeks thereafter, but prior to trial, the trial court held a

hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to defend himself, questioning
him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the voir dire. After

giving consideration to Faretta's responses and his "demeanor," the
court ruled that petitioner had not made a knowing and intelligent

waiver of his right to counsel, and that pursuant to a recent California
Supreme Court decision, 17 Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct
his own defense. Accordingly, the trial court reversed its earlier ruling

and again appointed the public defender to represent Faretta.' 8 At the
conclusion of the trial, Faretta was convicted and sentenced to imprisonupon representing himself in an earlier criminal proceeding. See Brief for Respondent
at 7.
15. 422 U.S. at 807.
16. For a record of the trial court's rather explicit caveat to Faretta see Brief for
Respondent at 7.
17. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 449 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
18. Following the reversal of the preliminary ruling by the trial court, defendant
Faretta's requests to act as co-counsel were denied. He also urged unsuccessfully that he
was entitled to the counsel of his choice and on three occasions moved for the
appointment of counsel other than the public defender. These motions, too, were denied
by the trial court. 422 U.S. at 810 & n.5. See Brief for Petitioner at 10.
Although the denial of these motions was not in issue in the Faretta decision, it
should be mentioned that in many, if not most, cases where a defendant requests the
right to represent himself, this is only as a last resort. The typical situation arises when
an indigent receives court-appointed counsel with whom he does not agree as to trial
tactics, in whom he reposes no confidence, or as in Faretta,where he believes the public
defender's office to be so overloaded with cases as to place his defense in jeopardy. Upon
being informed that an indigent is not entitled to counsel other than that appointed by
the court, Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973), the defendant turns to the pro se defense as the only
available alternative. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 14 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1007 (1966); Grano, supra note 3, at 1181.
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ment. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction following suit to People v. Sharp'9 with the California Supreme Court subsequently denying review.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the holdings of the
California courts and remanded the case without a showing of prejudice.
Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion, held that the implied
dictates of the sixth amendment give rise to the constitutional right of a
criminal defendant to forego counsel and represent himself at trial.
Furthermore, the right was viewed by the Court as of such a fundamental nature as to constitute due process requirements, made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Thus, it follows that the
accused in a criminal proceeding has a fundamental right to choose
between representation by counsel and pleading pro se, provided the
choice is "knowingly and intelligently" made. 20
Although the issues which inevitably arise in any discussion of the
pro se defense are several, Faretta primarily addressed itself to only
one: whether a defendant in a state criminal trial possesses the constitutional right to proceed without counsel; or, in other words, whether a
state may constitutionally force a lawyer upon a defendant, even though
he insists otherwise. Farettaseems to have resolved any doubt concerning the status of the right, yet inherent in the Court's reasoning there
appear subtle hints of inconsistencies regarding the attempt to pinpoint
the precise nature of the right, an issue not necessarily resolved by
Faretta. With respect to the foregoing, this comment represents an
attempt to articulate a viable constitutional basis for the pro se defense
through a critical inquiry into the legal reasoning promulgated by the
FarettaCourt. In addition, a further objective will be to formulate a
working hypothesis of the procedural implications of the Faretta decision, in an effort to more clearly effectuate its fundamental mandates.
11.

SouRcEs OF THE PRO SE DEFENSE

Prior to Faretta, the Supreme Court had never directly addressed
itself to the constitutional right of self-representation in a criminal
proceeding. But in 1942, the Court in Adams v. United States ex rel.
19. The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court could not be said to
have "abused its discretion in concluding that Faretta had not made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to be represented by counsel," and that the defendant "did
not appear aware of the possible consequence of waiving the opportunity for skilled and
experienced representation at trial." Brief for Petitioner at 10.
20. 422 U.S. at 835. See notes 107-118 infra and accompanying text.
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McCann,21 although in dictum, recognized an affirmative right to defend pro se; therefore, thorough analysis dictates that the discussion
begin here. Adams involved the contention by a criminal defendant
that the constitutional right to a jury trial could only be waived with the
advice of counsel. Justice Frankfurter dismissed the claim and proceeded to collateral comments concerning the pro se right:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative
right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms.
They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an
accused's position before the law. The public conscience
must be satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of
justice. An accused must have the means of presenting his
best defense.
. . . Vhen the administration
of criminal law
in the fed-

eral courts is hedged about as it is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of the accused, to deny him in the
exercise of his free choice -the right to dispense with some of
these safeguards . . . is to imprison a man in his privileges
and call it the Constitution.22
Upon scrutiny these rather cryptic statements obtain significance for it is
from within this language that persuasive arguments for the constitutional right to defend pro se emanate. Thus, Adams suggested a
correlative-right argument wherein the right to appear pro se is derived
mechanically from the assistance of counsel clause of the sixth amendment.23 The Court further seemed to intimate that implicitly in the
sixth amendment, there arises the right of a criminal defendant to
present "his best defense," one best suited to his own subjective desires.24 Finally, Justice Frankfurter tacitly pointed to due process considerations of fairness and liberty as giving birth to the right of a choice
of defense procedure when the accused "knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open."2
Four years subsequent to Adams, the Court in Carter v. Illinois26
21. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
22. Id. at 279-80.
23. In the context of constitutional theory, the distinction between a "correlative"
right and an "independent" right is directly related to their origins. A correlative right
is one which is necessarily derived through the affirmative right to waive rights of a
reciprocal nature which have been independently established in the constitutional text.
See notes 40-50 infra and accompanying text.
24. 317 U.S. at 279.
25. Id.
26. 329 U.S. 173 (1946). Accord Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (the
absence of the right of an accused to represent himself on appeal is to be sharply
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made explicit reference to the fundamental nature of the pro se right.

The case involved the claim by a defendant that he had been denied the
right to counsel after pleading guilty to a criminal offense.

Although

holding that the defendant had a constitutional right to counsel at every
stage of the trial, the Court ruled that the accused had waived counsel

by not requesting the assistance of such.
Again, Justice Frankfurter
proceeded in dictum to assert the constitutional right of an accused to
proceed without counsel:
Neither the historic conception of due process nor the vitality
it derives from progressive standards of justice denies a person

the right to defend himself or to confess guilt. Under appro-

priate circumstances the Constitution requires that counsel be
tendered; it does not require that28under all circumstances
counsel be forced upon a defendant.
Throughout the period following Adams and Carter, due to the
infrequency with which the Court addressed itself to the constitutional
issue, the configuration of the pro se right was, by necessity, forced onto
the shoulders of the lower courts. 29 Among the federal courts, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is prominent for its adherence
0
to the Supreme Court's dicta in Adams. In United States v. Plattner,3
contrasted with the constitutional right to be present at trial and defend pro se); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (dictum stating that the pro se right is derived
from the right to be present at trial and the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment). See also Moore v. Michigan 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957).
27. 329 U.S. at 177.
28. Id. at 174.
29. A majority of the federal circuits have demonstrated regard for the pro se
defense as one of constitutional dimensions and have supported their conclusions through
the various arguments expressed in Adams. See, e.g., Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d
362, 365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971) (sixth amendment correlative right); United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
930 (1970) (sixth amendment correlative right); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100,
103 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1048 (1970); United States v. Sternman, 415
F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970) (right held
constitutional through reliance on Adams); United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277,
285 (3rd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 850 (1966) (implying the constitutional
nature of the right although the holding is not explicit); United States ex rel. Maldonado
v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States
v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964); MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35, 41 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959) (holding the right to be implicitly derived through the
fifth amendment due process clause). But see United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966)
(concluding right to be merely statutory). Although the District of Columbia Circuit
had previously described the right as statutory in Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959), the Dougherty court viewed the issue as
unresolved, noting, however, that the right to self-representation appeared to have a
"constitutional aura" about it. 473 F.2d at 1122-23.
30. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
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the court held the right to appear pro se to be one "arising out of the
Federal Constitution" and remanded the case without a showing of
prejudice.3 1 The Plattner court expanded upon and to some extent
refined propositions of law suggested by Adams. Although only alluding to the correlative-right theory,3 2 the court proceeded to locate a
separate constitutional basis for the pro se right implicitly in both the
fifth and sixth amendments. The sixth amendment provisions for
notice, confrontation, and compulsory process, considered to be "minimum requirements of due process," were viewed as giving the criminally
accused personal rights with which to pursue an effective defense at
trial. As a logical corollary, Plattner concluded that the sixth amendment's contemplation of "personal rights" coupled with procedural due
process considerations in the fifth amendment cogently suggested the
inference of "the right of the accused personally to manage and conduct
33
his own defense."
The Plattnerdual amendment rationale, however, may be regarded
as exhibiting alternative sources through which to derive the right to
defend pro se, suggesting perhaps that the respective constitutional
interests protected therein are of a conflicting nature.34 The theory that
a conceptual dichotomy of due process is supportive of the fundamental
nature of the right was subsequently manifested in United States ex. rel.
Maldonado v. Denno,33 where the court, in construing Adams, placed
the origins of the right on two rather contrary bases. While acknowledging the sixth amendment argument presented in Adams and Plattner
as giving the accused "his best defense," the Denno court further
recognized that although the accused may receive his most inferior
31. Id. at 273.
32. The Plattner allusion to the pro se right as being "correlative" may be implicitly
derived from a perusal of the following language: "rhe right to counsel and the right to
defend pro se in criminal cases form a single, inseparable bundle of rights, two fases
[sic] of the same coin." 330 F.2d at 276.
33. 330 F.2d at 273-74. The Plattner court elicited support for its arguments
through a brief historical discussion of the sixth amendment, noting that the "assistance
of counsel" clause contained therein was "not intended to limit in any way the absolute
and primary right to conduct one's own defense in propria persona." Id. at 274. The
court's discussion also included reference to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1
Stat. 73 (for the current provision see 28 U.S.C. § 1654), enacted by the First Congress
and signed by President Washington one day before the proposal of the sixth amendment, and Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, both of which compel the
existence of a statutory right to dispense with counsel and proceed pro se. 330 F.2d at
274.
34. 330 F.2d at 274. See Note, Where Is the Constitutional Right to SelfRepresentation and Why Is the California Supreme Court Saying All Those Terrible
Things About It?, 10 CALiP. W.L. REv. 196, 201 (1973).
35. 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
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defense through the use of the pro se device, "respect for individual
autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner
if he so desires ...
"36
To summarize the supportive case law, then, it would appear that
the right of self-representation sustains its constitutional dimensions in
varying forms. Thus, a literal reading of the Adams and Carter dicta
points toward the right as "correlative," receiving its vitality from a valid
waiver of the right to counsel.7 The Adams-Carter dicta acquire
added meaning, however, when read in conjunction with subsequent
case law in the Second Circuit seeking to interpret the earlier references
to the right. A more expansive reading of Adams, therefore, reveals an
independent basis for the pro se defense, implicitly derived from the
confrontation and compulsory witness clauses in the sixth amendment.18
Yet in addition to its sixth amendment origins, a third constitutional
argument for the pro se right may be gleaned from a flexible reading of
the case law exclusively in terms of due process. This basis appears to
exist as a result of Denno's emphasis on statements made in Adams and
Carterlending sway to the right as emanating from natural law sources
contained within the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.39 Whether and to what extent the various pro se theories
are constitutionally compatible may only be resolved by subjecting to
scrutiny the Faretta reasoning and its consistency with constitutional
theory.
II.

NATuRE OF THE RIGHT IN LIGHT OF

CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

A.

FOuNDATIoNs IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

In reaching its decision, the FarettaCourt placed admitted reliance
upon the sixth amendment propositions enunciated in both Adams and
Plattner. However, while the salient thrust of the Adams dicta was
concerned mostly with the pro se right as being a "correlative-right," 40
this premise was perfunctorily dismissed by Faretta. Discussing the
argument in a footnote, the Court conveyed skepticism toward the idea
that rights may be automatically derived from constitutional expressions
guaranteeing rights of the opposite character:
36. Id. at 15.

37. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text; notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.

40. 317 U.S. at 279. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
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Our concern is with an independent right of self-representation. We do not suggest that the right arises mechanically
from a defendant's power to waive the right to the assistance
On the contrary, the right must be indeof counsel. ...
in
the structure and history of the constipendently found
41
tutional text.
The Court's attitude in this respect must be attributed to Singer v.
United States,4" a decision concerning the constitutional mandate of trial
by jury. The Singer issue involved claims by a defendant that the right
to waive a jury trial and be tried solely by the court existed as a
necessary correlate to the expressly compelled trial by jury in article mI,
section 2 of the United States Constitution. Although rejecting the
correlative-rights argument as giving constitutional status to the right to
be tried without a jury, Singer intimated the possibility of an exception
to the rule: "The ability to waive a constitutional right does not
ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that
43
right."
Farettds approval of the Singer rationale was apparently based on
the presumption that the nature of the right to counsel is analogous to
that of trial by jury, the presumption extending as well to their alleged
correlates. But it is through this reasoning that Faretta'sacceptance of
Singer proves to be ill-warranted, for there are perceptible distinctions
which can be derived from the rights involved. The right to a jury trial
as expressed in article ]I is formulated in terms which bespeak commands of an absolute or imperative nature: "The trial of all Crimes
. . . shall be by Jury. . ...

""

By contrast, the "Assistance of Coun-

ser' provision embodied in the sixth amendment is expressed in somewhat less-than-imperative language, evincing expressions of a suggestive
or supplementary nature.45 Thus, it would seem that legislative intentions with respect to trial by jury were of a more compelling nature than
those regarding the right to counsel. Although present case law does
not hold the jury trial to be absolutely required, 46 historically, there is
evidence in the federal courts to the effect that trial by jury was solely
41. 422 U.S. at 819-20 n.15 (emphasis in original).

42. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
43. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
45. For an excellent discussion suggesting that the sixth amendment guarantees of
counsel are significantly different from the more directory constitutional language with
regard to jury trials see Self Representation in Criminal Trials, supra note 3, at 1488.
46. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); 51 A.L.R.2d 1346 (1957).
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contemplated in criminal proceedings.47 The origins of the right to
counsel suggest otherwise. In fact, it is on grounds of historical usage
and custom that the rights litigated in Faretta and Singer must be

distinguished.

The Singer Court indicated that since no compelling

historical basis for the right to be tried without a jury had existed in

English common law or American colonial experience, the right could
not be insisted upon via the correlative-rights argument. 48 Antithetically, the correlate of the right to counsel-pleading pro se-was found by
Farettato be pervasive in English and American colonial history, with

the right to assistance of counsel appearing subsequently as an alternative. 49 Perhaps the Singer Court would have found the correlative47. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1965); Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65, 68-70 (1904); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 354 (1898); Coates v.
United States, 290 F. 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1923).
48. 380 U.S. at 26.
49. 422 U.S. at 821-32. The Farettainquiry into the historical origins of the right
to defend pro se revealed that at the English common law, self-representation and not
representation by counsel was the usual mode of procedure in the trial of serious crimes.
Id. at 823. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, then, individuals charged with
felonies or treason, as a practice, represented themselves in defending against the
accusations of the Crown. See 1 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LANv
211 (1909); 1 J. ST.EPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 341 (1883),

noted in 422 U.S. at 823-24. Subsequent criminal reforms in English law extended the
right to counsel to all defendants, first to alleged traitors through the Treason Act of
1695, 7 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1, and subsequently to felons by statute in 1836, 6 & 7 "Will.4, c.
114, § 1. However, the common law rule, stated in R. v. Woodward, [1944] 1 K.B. 118,
continued to be that counsel could not be forced upon the criminally accused without his
consent. 422 U.S. at 826. For discussions of the English common law practice see
Grano, supra note 3, at 1190-92 and The Right to Appear, supra note 3, at 244 n.64.
In the American colonies, the right to self-representation was found by Farettato be
of an even more fundamental nature than in England. Reflected by "virtues of selfreliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers" among the colonists, the right to plead pro
se was manifested in many colonial charters and declarations of rights as well as in
theories of natural law pervading the political climate. 422 U.S. at 926-28. For
example, see art. 26, Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641), reprinted in 1 B.
ScHwARTz, THE BILL OF RIrarrS: A DocumENTARY HISTORY 74 (1971), which provides
in part:
Every man that findeth himselfe unfit to plead his owne cause in any Court
shall have Libertie to imploy any man against whom the Court doth not except, to helpe him, Provided he give him noe fee or reward for his paines.
This shall not exempt the partie him selfe from Answering such Questions in
person as the Court shall thinke meete to demand of him.
Similarly the Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682, thought to be one of the more
influential colonial documents on individual liberties, further provided: "That, in all
courts all persons of all persuasions may freely appear in their own way, and according
to their own manner, and there personally plead their own cause themselves; or, if
unable, by their friends.. . ." 1 B. ScHwAR", THE BILL OF RIoHTs: A DocumENTArY
HISTORY 140 (1971). Post-Revolution state constitutions began to recognize the value
of representation by counsel, but only as a supplement to the more basic right of selfrepresentation. 422 U.S. at 828-29 & n.38. See generally ScHwARTz, supra, at 256-379.
For a rather detailed discussion of the American colonial experience with regard to the
pro se right see CriminalDefendants at the Bar, supra note 3, at 348-50.
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rights argument more persuasive, had the right to waive a jury trial been
established as truly analogous to the pro se right in its common law
origins.5" Nevertheless, proper analysis of Singer suggests the right to
self-representation as one of those exceptional situations to which the
Singer rationale should not be applicable.
As noted above, the FarettaCourt was circumspect in its search for
an "independent" constitutional basis for the affirmative right to proceed to trial without counsel. Adopting the Second Circuit!s reasoning
in Plattner, this basis was established implicitly through the notice,
confrontation, and compulsory witness clauses of the sixth amendment.51 Initially the Court adverted to the settled proposition that
rights secured by the sixth amendment reflect values so fundamental as
to constitute due process requisites of a fair trial.52 Discerning that
these fundamental "rights to make a defense as we know it" are granted
personally to the criminal defendant, the Court concluded that the
generic thrust of the sixth amendment contemplates the accused as more
than a mere spectator at trial:
It is the accused, not counsel, who must be "informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation," who must be "confronted
with the witnesses against him," and who must be accorded
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the
right to self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is thus
necessarily implied by the structure of the
53
Amendment.
The Farettareasoning appears to be sound. The sixth amendment
expressly guarantees to the accused the right to be confronted with
witnesses and to have compulsory process.54 Clearly, the safeguards
contained therein were intended to enhance as well as protect the
50. In addition to the apparent historical distinctions between the waivers of the
right to counsel and that of trial by jury, it should be noted that Singer accurately
perceived the distinctions between the rights in question. Thus, it is significant that
when the Court specifically enumerated various rights which could not be waived over
the objections of the prosecution, the waiver of counsel was not included therein. 380
U.S. at 35.

Instead, Singer referred to the waiver of counsel as merely susceptible to

"reasonable procedural regulations." Id. In any event, the refusal by Faretta to
distinguish the Singer mandate proves to be provident in the subsequent implementation
of the pro se right. See notes 119-126 infra and accompanying text.
51. 422 U.S. at 819.
52. Id. at 818.

53. Id. at 819 (footnote omitted).
54. For a brief discussion of the structure and terms of the sixth amendment see
Criminal Defendants at the Bar, supra note 3, at 339-41.
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defendant in the presentation of his defense. Moreover, although the
Supreme Court has traditionally stated the right to be present at all
pertinent stages of the trial as one inhering in precepts of due process,"
Justice Black more recently in Illinois v. Allen,56 referred to the right as
implicitly founded in the sixth amendment.57 The view that the right to
be present at trial derives from the confrontation and compulsory witness clauses is significant, for it demonstrates the personal character of
the amendment. If rights provided by the sixth amendment could be
exercised solely through the intermediary of counsel, the fundamentally
held right to be present at trial would be subordinated to little more than
mere formalism. Thus, the notion that the sixth amendment revolves
around the accused and not counsel receives support from Snyder v.
Massachusetts,58 where the Court acknowledged the right to be present
at trial as involving the right of the accused "to give advice or suggestions or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial
himself."5 9 Although the defendant's retention of counsel may provide
counsel with "the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in
many areas, '' 60 surely a logical construction of the sixth amendment
55. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934); Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1911); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374
(1892); Schwab v. Bergen, 143 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1892); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574,
579 (1884).
56. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
57. Id. at 342.

58. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).

59. Resolution of the issue pursuant to this line of reasoning necessarily involves the
judicial construction of the sixth amendment's structure and history. Framed in these
terms, the question becomes whether the right to counsel is superior to, and therefore
predominant over other sixth amendment guarantees, the result of which would require
the exercise of those rights through the intermediary of counsel; or put more succinctly,
whether the right to be present at trial is indeed a mere formality. The Second Circuit,
however, in Plattner v. United States, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964), seems to have
reached an opposite result, concluding that the right to counsel was intended to "buttress
and supplement" other sixth amendment rights and not "to limit in any way the absolute
and primary right to conduct one's own defense in propriapersona." Id. at 274. The
Plattner conclusions were based on the historical premise that the framers of the sixth
amendment recognized that many criminal defendants would not have the legal capabilities necessary to properly effectuate their sixth amendment rights and therefore drafted
the assistance of counsel clause accordingly. Id. See The Right to Defend, supra note
3, at 686. To the extent that Farettaaccorded preference to Plattnerin deriving the pro
se right implicitly from both the confrontation clause and the right to be present at trial,
the foregoing historical construction of the sixth amendment was adopted by Faretta.422
U.S. at 818-19. See notes 30-33, 51 supra and accompanying text.
60. 422 U.S. at 820. Much of the discord for the right to self-representation has
concerned the apprehension that once criminal defendants were made cognizant of this
right, they would attempt to assert it at every dissatisfaction with trial decisions made by
counsel. However, these fears are unfounded, for it should be emphasized that under
current law, the acceptance of a lawyer by the accused establishes counsel as "the
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justifies this by giving the defendant the basic control of his defense, that
is, whether to proceed pro se, or accept counsel with its concomitant
allocation of power.
B.

APPLICABILITY TO THE STATES:
THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS DICHOTOMY

Notwithstanding the sixth amendment basis for the pro se defense,
perhaps the true nature of the Faretta right is most discernible through
an examination of the Court's utilization of procedural due process in
providing fundamental limitations on state enforcement policies."1 Pursuant to the more contemporary constitutional decisions with regard to
the incorporation theory of the Bill of Rights, 2 Faretta ostensibly
extended the implied sixth amendment precepts to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 63 Yet it is through the
use of the sixth amendment as the tour de force in precipitating the
manager of the lawsuit." Rhay v. Browder, 342 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1965). This
"acceptance" by the criminal defendant gives counsel the authority to make important
tactical decisions at trial, including the assertion or waiver of certain rights guaranteed to
the defendant by the Constitution. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973) (counsel may waive the defendant's confrontation right under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments by failing to cross-examine an adverse witness); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534-36 (1972) (implies the power of counsel to agree to a
continuance, thus waiving the defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial); Henry
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (counsel may decline to make evidentiary
objections, thus waiving the defendant's fourth amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure); Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 964 (1965) (granting to counsel power to determine trial strategy and tactics
generally). For a discussion of the allocation of power accorded trial counsel see Grano
supra note 3, at 1213-20. On the other hand, however, the waiver of a jury trial, the
decision to enter a guilty plea, and the decision not to appeal convictions are viewed as
exclusively within the province of the defendant and not subject to waiver by counsel.
See Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation,Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CAL. L REV. 1262, 1268 (1966). In according
the criminal defendant the basic and initial control of his defense, Faretta depicted the
sixth amendment as a constitutional safety valve, giving the accused the choice of
accepting counsel as the manager of his case, or dispensing with counsel and proceeding
pro se. But see notes 119-26 infra and accompanying text.
61. In the context of the fourteenth amendment, procedural due process has been
characterized as a "constitutional reservoir of values" judicially employed to place
fundamental limitations on state procedures in the adjudication and seizure of persons or
property. See Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1048, 1049 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ratner].
62. The modem trend of the Supreme Court has been to view the fourteenth
amendment due process clause as "selectively" incorporating various Bill of Rights
limitations into state policies, not necessarily because they are expressed in the Constitution but because they are "fundamental to the American scheme of justice. . . necessary
to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." See Ratner, supra note 61, at 105455, quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
63. 422 U.S. at 818.
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functional use of due process that the Court's reasoning becomes superfluous, rendering itself subject to criticism.
The Supreme Court has frequently identified procedural due
process requirements as those constitutional expressions considered so
fundamental as to be "essential to a fair trial.""4 Toward this end, due
process is designed to insure and promote what has been termed "the
reliability of the guilt-determining process," a substantial social objective
in every criminal proceeding." 5 It is through these fair trial-truth
ascertainment policies that rights contemplated by the sixth amendment
have been accorded fundamental stature. In fact, it should be emphasized that each protection rendered the criminal defendant by the sixth
amendment bears a direct and exclusive relation to the truth-determining objective of due process. 6 Hence, the accused in a state criminal
trial has the constitutionally guaranteed right to confront all witnesses
proffering evidence against him, 6 7 to compulsory process for obtaining
favorable evidence, 8 and to receive the assistance of counsel."' Furthermore, although the Court has adverted to fair trial definitions of due
process in restricting state procedures not expressly proscribed by the
Constitution, these conclusions have served to further the truth interests
found within the purview of the sixth amendment.70
64. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
65. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kadish]. For a discussion
of the "fair trial" values contained within procedural due process and their objective of
facilitating the determination of truth at trial see Ratner, supra note 61, at 1064-65.
66. "mhe accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, . . .to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

67. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
68. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
69. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). Other cases incorporating the truth-determining interests in the sixth amendment to the states include Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment
jury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment speedy
trial).
70. The judicial development of the constitutional right to be present at trial
provides sufficient evidence of this point. Although not expressed in the Constitution,
the right of a criminal defendant to be present at trial has been traditionally identified
with fair trial considerations of due process in the fourteenth amendment. See note 55
supra. Subsequently, however, when the various incorporation theories became in vogue
with the Court, the truth interests engendered by the right prompted Justice Black in
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342 (1970), to derive the sources for the right through
the sixth amendment by implication. For other decisions recognizing the constitutional
stature of rights not expressly included in the Constitution, but which promote the sixth
amendment objective of a reliable guilt-determining process, see Harris v. New York, 401
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The question inevitably arises, therefore, whether the right to
proceed without counsel facilitates truth determination in the criminal
setting. Arguably it does not, for it must be acknowledged that the gist
of the right-to-counsel cases involved the realization that representation
by counsel is indispensable if accurate factual and legal determinations
are to be made at trial." Admittedly, occasion will arise whereby
Faretta'ssixth amendment rationale will become appropriate as a constitutional basis with which to provide to the accused "his best defense,"
yet the probability of such seems to be rather exiguous. 2 It should be
observed that the sixth amendment rationale for the pro se defense is
consistent with due process only in those specific instances where selfrepresentation will exceed representation by counsel in more nearly
effectuating the determination of truth at trial."8 In a more practical
U.S. 222 (1971) (defendant has the right to testify in his own behalf); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (defendant may be convicted only if his guilt is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (state may not deny a
defendant the right to have his counsel guide him on direct examination). See generally
Ratner, supra note 61, at 1065-66.
71. See notes 1, 8-10 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, Justice Sutherland's
words in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), have become classic in describing the
belief that, in most circumstances, the determination of truth at trial is best effectuated
through the assistance of counsel:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. . . . If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is
it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. at 69. See Grano, supranote 3, at 1195.
72. There are essentially two circumstances through which it may be argued that pro
se representation is preferable to representation by counsel when measured objectively by
the fair trial standard. First, there seems to be growing concern with the quality of
advocacy furnished to defendants in the criminal courts, especially to those defendants
considered to be indigent. For comments on the competence, or rather incompetence of
legal representation being offered in many urban communities, see Burger, The Special
Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to
Our System of Justice?, 42 FoRDHAM L. Rn.v. 227 (1973). The second situation, of
course, is that in which the defendant, by reason of personal knowledge or capabilities in
specific areas, can best defend himself through his own efforts. This would be
particularly true in prosecutions for crimes of a technical nature. See, e.g., United States
v. Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1957) (defendant was expert on the
chemistry of chloroform and believed he could cross-examine witnesses better than
counsel). With regard to trials of a political nature, it has been suggested that
defendants more concerned with "maintain[ing] the integrity of their political and moral
commitments" than with defending on the merits may, by "personally interacting" with
the court, be able to defend themselves successfully through moral justifications. See
Self Representation in Criminal Trials,supra note 3, at 1503-04.
73. This conclusion is premised on the following syllogism:
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sense, it is beyond dispute that a vast majority of persons endeavoring to
represent themselves possess inadequate financial resources, have received limited educational opportunities, and/or have retained political
philosophies deemed undesirable by majoritarian attitudes.7 4 It is submitted that this class of criminal defendants is most susceptible to harm

in attempting to participate personally in a rather complex adversary
system. Perhaps more. importantly, it would appear to be the general
consensus of the courts that the probability of conviction is raised
significantly when the accused dispenses with counsel and proceeds
pro se.

75

Thus, congruity compels the assertion that if the promotion of the
truth-determining process is the sole criterion in adjudicating procedural
due process, then, a fortiori, it would seem that in a majority of cases
where the benefits of counsel transcend those of lay representation, due
process would require the appointment of counsel. Under these circumstances, the sixth amendment, by having been consistently applied to the
states through the fair trial concept of due process, does not provide
fundamental legitimacy to the pro se defense.
The Court, however, has not hesitated to implement alternative
formulations of due process in reaching conclusions not fully explicable
Rights contemplated by the sixth amendment have consistently provided fundamental limitations on state procedures exclusively through the fair trial-truth concept of due
process. See notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text. However, self-representation
does not, in most circumstances, facilitate the determination of truth at trial. See notes
71-75 and accompanying text. Therefore, the sixth amendment rationale for the pro se
defense is repugnant to due process in a majority of cases. For a somewhat analogous
criticism of the sixth amendment as a pro se source, see The Right to Appear, supra note
3, at 246; Note, CriminalProcedure-Rightto Defend Pro Se, 48 N.C.L. Rav. 678, 682
(1970).
74. See generally L. SLvERsa-n r, DEENSB OF T POOR iN CRIMNNAL CASES IN
AMmnCAN STATE Couris 7 (1965) (half of 300,000 felony defendants in state courts
classified as indigent based on inability to make bail); Potts, Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases: Legal Aid or Public Defender, 28 TEX. L. REv. 491 (1950); SelfRepresentation in Criminal Trials, supra note 3, at 1498-1504.
75. See The Right to Appear, supra note 3, at 248-49, for the results of an empirical
study concerning the pragmatic implications of pro se representation, conducted among
ninety-nine Illinois judges. Questions asked the judges included, inter alia, their opinions
as to the success rate of pro se defendants, and their priority of reasons for the
convictions or acquittals of such defendants. Significantly, many judges replied that they
could not remember a successful pro se defendant in a felony trial, while the remainder
put the success rate at less than 5 percent. Although a majority of the judges believed
the "obvious guilt" of the defendants to be the predominant reason for pro se convictions,
the defendant's ignorance of the law, and his general ignorance received second and third
billing, respectively. Interestingly enough, when asked about the reasons for a pro se
defendant's acquittal, forty-one of the forty-six judges who replied to the question
believed the acquittals to have been caused by the weakness of the prosecution's case.
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in the truth-ascertainment objectives discussed above. These formula-

tions, exemplified by interests protected by the fourth and fifth amendments, serve to sustain and enhance the dignity and autonomy of the
individual in retaining certain freedoms of choice regarded as inherent

in every democratic society. 76 Thus, freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures as well as the privilege against self-incrimination have

been concluded as being fundamental and therefore applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment even though these conclusions
are, to a great extent, prohibitive with regard to -the fair trial concept of
due process. 77

Perhaps the real value of this alternative concept of due process lies
in the fact that fundamental protections may be judicially derived from
extra-constitutional, natural law sources embodied in the due process

clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, in an effort to prevent
unduly burdensome interference with individual liberties."5 The judi76. Kadish, supra note 65, at 347, where in referring to case law revealing this
alternative formulation of due process, the author states:
mhey all suggest the presence of a value other than the reliability of the
guilt affixing process. Central to these requirements is the notion of man's
dignity, which is denigrated equally by procedures that fail to respect [the defendant's] intrinsic privacy or that entail the imposition of shocking brutality
upon him. The ideal of man's individuality, which,... is what infuses meaning into the concept of freedom, is an emotional and personal as well as an
intellectual affair. The temper of society is the soil in which it must find nourishment. Where society's sanctioned procedures exhibit a disdain for the value
of the human personality, that ideal is not likely to flourish.
77. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment self-incrimination
privilege); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence obtained through
violation of fourth amendment search and' seizure extended to states); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) (unconstitutional search and seizure violative of due process
although exclusionary rule restricted to federal government). The development of the
exclusionary rule from Wolf to Mapp is instructive on this point. While the Court in
Wolf recognized a zone of privacy interests protected by the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, these protections were held to be distinct from and less substantial than
those embodied in the fourth amendment. 338 U.S. at 26. As a result, Wolf failed to
extend the full import of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states, thereby
causing disparate treatment of the rule in the federal and state courts. However, Mapp
subsequently remedied this disparity by "selectively incorporating" the fourth amendment
into the fourteenth and thereby making it applicable to the states. 367 U.S. at 654-55.
Whether the actual underpinnings of due process are disguised by the incorporation
theories or not, the Mapp-Wolf rubric demonstrates a predisposition towards the identification of due process as protecting the autonomy and privacy of the individual. The
doctrinal significance of Mapp lies in the fact that the foregoing alternative concept of
due process may at times be as compelling as its truth-determining counterpart. For a
discussion of the Mapp formulation of due process versus the reliability of the guiltdetermining process as they relate to the right to counsel, see Kamisar, The Right to
Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue of "The Most Pervasive Right" of
an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 37 (1962).
78. See Ratner, supra note 61, at 1048-49, 1056-57. Natural law values, as used in
the context of due process, refers to societal interests, not transcendental values. Id. at
1049. See also Kadish, supra note 65, at 325-26.
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cial belief that due process may be employed to articulate fundamental
rights affording respect for individual autonomy not expressly indicated
by the Bill of Rights is reflected by the Court's decision in Rochin v.
California.79 Rochin involved the issue of whether reliable evidence
forcibly retrieved from the stomach of the defendant was admissible in a
state criminal trial. Although the concurring opinions ruled the evidence inadmissible as violative of fifth amendment self-incrimination
values incorporated into the states via the fourteenth amendment, 80 a
majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, placed the
holding exclusively within the confines of due process:
Due Process of law, as a historic and generative principle,
precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of
conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot
be brought about by methods that offend "a sense of justice ....
. . . [Coerced confessions] are inadmissible under the
Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them
may be independently established as true. [They] offend the
community's sense of fair play and decency.81
Although the Court has labeled natural law values in varying
terms, the "sense of justice" test of procedural due process represented
by Rochin reflects the judicial notion that in some circumstances, fair
trial-truth objectives must be subordinated to more fundamental policies
insuring respect for the freedom, dignity, and privacy of the individual."2 Thus framed in terms of due process, the typical issue presented in
79. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
80. Id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 173 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). Subsequent to Rochin, the
Court concluded in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964), that the unlawful search and seizure and self-incrimination values of the
fourth and fifth amendments were applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, thereby rendering the Rochin standard superfluous in the
area of self-incrimination. Ratner, supra note 61, at 1054 n.31. See note 77 supra. It
is significant to note, however, that the Rochin "sense of justice" standard has been
reaffirmed in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 (1966) (dictum). Ratner,
supra note 61, at 1054 n.31. The Schmerber reference to Rochin, made after the
selective incorporation of the fourth and fifth amendments in Mapp and Malloy, seems
to indicate that fundamental protections not expressed in the Constitution may be
independently derived through the due process clause.
82. The development of Anglo-American procedures associated with due
process in the traditional criminal law area exemplifies . . . value accommodation. The important values of maximizing the reliability of the guilt determination process and preserving respect for the individual would appear on
the surface to conflict with the value of enforcing the criminal law by punishing as many guilty persons as possible. In actuality, however, the procedures
evolved to define criminal law due process can be more usefully and accurately
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cases involving procedural coercion concerns whether the societal interest in objectively determining innocence or guilt is sufficiently high to, in
effect, abrogate the individual's interest in retaining some degree of
autonomy and discretion in criminal matters to which the accused has
been involuntarily subjected. The social model, however, has interests
which extend beyond the guarantee that a trial be objectively fair. These
interests serve to assure the continued public faith in government
through the credibility of its judicial system, a credibility dependent, to a
large extent, upon the security which it provides to its constituents.8 3
This security is best maintained when society is convinced that a person
may only be deprived of life or liberty through procedures which, in
addition to being objectively fair, are fair in the subjective sense that
they demonstrate regard for the intrinsic quality of each individual in
84
the community.
Considered analysis of the constitutional policies underlying the
right to defend pro se compels its inclusion within the more subjective
formulations of due process inherent in the Rochin category. Like most
of the rather personal safeguards protected in the fourth and fifth
amendment area, self-representation in most instances, does not present
great appeal to the truth-determining process. 85 Indeed, both Faretta
and Rochin disclose attempts by state authorities to severely restrict the
accused's freedom of choice in an effort to implement fair trial policies.
Yet under existing case law where the forced appointment of counsel is
particularly oppressive to the indigent defendant, 86 due process may be
viewed, not... as a compromise of the conflicting values, [but] as their accommodation ....
Kadish, supra note 65, at 348-49. See The Right to Defend, supra note 3, at 704.
83. See note 87 infra.
84. See The Right of an Accused, supra note 3, at 1152-53.
85. See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 18 & 60 supra. That the prohibition of pro se representation would be
unduly oppressive to the indigent was recognized by Justice Stanley Mosk in Drumgo v.
Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
979 (1973), where, in dissenting, he stated:
The desirability of a relationship of trust and confidence between an indigent
defendant and his attorney has been elevated to indispensability as a result of
this court's recent decision in People v. Sharp [7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489,
103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972)], holding that a defendant has no constitutional
right to defend pro se at trial. Prior thereto an indigent defendant had three
choices open to him if he lacked confidence in his appointed counsel and the
judge refused to designate an attorney of his choice: he could permit the attorney to represent him and abjectly be bound by crucial trial decisions with
which he might disagree . . .; he could dismiss the attorney and proceed to
represent himself. . .; or he could in unusual circumstances dismiss the attorney from responsibility for the case and represent himself but have counsel
standing by for advice. . . . After Sharp an indigent defendant has no choice
as a matter of right: he must be represented by the appointed counsel. Thus
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extended to prohibit the coercion of counsel through countervailing
societal interests demanding "fair play and decency" in the manner in
which individuals are brought to trial.8 The public conscience must be
assured that the government will not exercise its obvious power advantages in enacting procedures which unduly restrict the accused's basic
choice in the means of his defense, for the consequences of that choice
8
will inevitably be attributed to him. s

Despite the apparent Faretta sixth amendment rationale, perusal
and inspection of the Court's reasoning reveal the pro se right to be
predicated on a procedural dichotomy of due process contained in both
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Thus, in circumstances where
pro se representation will enhance the guilt-determining process in
criminal trials, the fair trial concept of due process will become appropriate as the means through which the fundamental nature of the right is
derived. It is by way of this concept that the Supreme Court has,
consistently with constitutional theory, provided the implicit foundations for procedural rights in the sixth amendment.8 9 As Farettarecognized, however, the conferral of the right to self-representation is inimical to the determination of truth at trial, since in a majority of
circumstances, the dispensation of counsel will significantly diminish
any real defense the accused may have otherwise had.90 The Court's
increasing demands for the "guiding hand of counsel" in criminal
litigation during the past four decades seem sufficient testimony to that
in this case, the defendant must proceed with the appointed attorney, in place
of other counsel in whom he has expressed confidence; as a result he will be
compelled to acquiesce in subsequent trial tactics which he may find objectionable. . . It seems inevitable that this procedure will create serious problems
in the administration of justice throughout the trial and future appeals, if any.
Id. at 938-39, 506 P.2d at 1012-13, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
87. Due Process is involved only marginally with who wins or who loses; its
primary focus is on how the accused was brought to trial and how his case
was tried. The judicial system's credibility depends- on this. Crucial to this
credibility is the defendant's own determination of his defense, i.e., his trial
strategy, his theory of defense, his decision whether or not to take the witness
stand. The choice should be left to him because he has the most to lose if
the choice is wrong and the community-at-large must not be allowed to believe
that the fate of an accused was sealed before trial began due to government
dictation as to methods of defense. The same due process considerations that
allow a defendant to choose his defense also require that he be allowed the
choice of representing himself. Without this right of choice, the defendant becomes a mere spectator at his trial, his destiny to be decided by a system over
which others exercise complete control.
The Right to Appear, supra note 3, at 247 (footnote omitted).
88. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
89. See notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text.
90. 422 U.S. at 834. See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
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fact.9 1 It was this rather magnanimous trend that prompted the Faretta
majority to face squarely a more elusive formulation of due process, one
which, in providing deference to individual autonomy, necessarily
clashes with the fair trial concept in balancing the interests of selfrepresentation. Although due process in its subjective sense has been
judicially employed mostly in the vernacular of the fourth and fifth
amendment zone of privacy interests, 9 2 the Faretta extension of these
defendant's
principles provides fundamental protection to the criminal
93
self-determinism in matters crucial to his future liberty.
IV.

PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT

Although Faretta failed to provide specific procedural guidelines
with which to implement subsequent assertions of the right to selfrepresentation,9 4 nevertheless the Court reaffirmed the existence of qualifications to the right where countervailing interests are demonstrated.
Evaluation of the extent to which the pro se right may be asserted
therefore necessitates the analysis of existing case law purporting to limit
the right and the simultaneous measuring of the interests pervading
these limitations by the fundamental mandate of Faretta.
A.

INTEREST IN OBJECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Assertions of the Right Before Trial
Since the assertion of the pro se right invariably conflicts, at least
in most circumstances, with the fundamental policies surrounding the
91. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
93. The Farettaanalogy to the Mapp-Rochin privacy scheme of due process may be
discerned through the Court's emphasis on the criminal defendant's freedom of choice
values, enabling the defendant to either defend pro se or through the representation of
counsel:
Freedom of choice is not a stranger to the constitutional design of procedural
protections for a defendant in a criminal proceeding. For example, "[elvery
criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to
do so."
422 U.S. at 834 n.45, quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
94. In criticizing the Faretta majority's failure to address the procedural problems
involved in implementing the pro se right, Justice Blackmun in his dissent posed many of
the more immediate issues:
Must every defendant be advised of his right to defend pro se? If so, when
must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and the
right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each
right to be measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still have a right to assistance of standby counsel? How
soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding
by counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May a violation of the right to self-representation ever be harmless error? Must the trial
court treat the pro se defendant differently than it would professional counsel?
422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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right to counsel, it is well established that self-representation at trial
may only be permitted where the defendant "'knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes open.' ,9 As the Court stated in
Johnson v.Zerbst: 8
The constitutional right to an accused to be represented
by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in
which the accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and
weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining
whether 97
there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the
accused.

The implications of requiring that a defendant be fully cognizant of
the consequences of dispensing with counsel are two-fold. First, it is
indicative of the criterion to which a trial judge must adhere in balancing the individual's pro se requests with the interests of society in
achieving the proper administration of justice. Where the accused is
incapable of understanding the consequences of his decision, counsel
must be appointed in order to insure that the objective ends of justice
are achieved.98 Moreover, the requirement of a competent waiver of
counsel serves to preclude subsequent attacks on appeal by disappointed pro se defendants, urging reversible error through the denial of the
fair trial benefits of counsel.99
95. Id. at 835 (majority opinion), quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
96. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
97. Id. at 465 (emphasis added). Subsequently, in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948), the Court said:
It is the solemn duty of a federal judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure
the fullest protection of this constitutional right [to the assistance of counsel]
at every stage of the proceedings.
Id. at 722.
98. Under these circumstances, societal interests in the fair trial-truth determining
process become compelling and therefore must override the individual's otherwise fundamental pro se interest. See United States v. Brown, 335 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1964);
The Right of an Accused, supra note 3, at 1146; Grano, supra note 3, at 1200-03. See
generally notes 61-93 supra and accompanying text.
99. The dilemma in which courts are frequently placed in dealing with the attempted
waiver of counsel is illustrated in People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 63 Cal. Rptr.
626 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967), where the court stated:
Cunning criminals consistently take advantage of it and all too often the demand for self-representation becomes a "heads I win tails you lose" proposition. If the trial court too readily accedes to it an appellate court will find
the waiver of the right to counsel to be ineffectual. Conversely, if the court
leans over backwards in protecting the latter right, it runs the risk of depriving
defendant of the former.
Id. at 23-24, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 629. See Note, Where is the ConstitutionalRight to SelfRepresentation and Why Is the California Supreme Court Saying All Those Terrible
Things About It?, 10 CALIF. W.L. RV. 196, 209 (1973).
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In order to properly apprise the accused of his constitutional rights
and to establish a record wherein the thread of reversible error will not
be sewn, the Second Circuit has suggested a model inquiry which should
be made by the courts upon being presented with criminal defendants:
[I]t is incumbent upon the presiding judge, by recorded colloquy with the defendant, to explain to the defendant: that
he has the choice between defense by a lawyer and defense
pro se; that, if he has no means to retain a lawyer of his own
choice, the judge will assign a lawyer to defend him, without
expense or obligation to him; that he will be given a reasonable time within which to make the choice; that it is advisable
to have a lawyer, because of the special skill and training in
the law and that the judge believes it is in the best interest
of the defendant to have a lawyer, but that he may, if he
elects to do so, waive his right to a lawyer and conduct and
manage his defense himself. If the result is a waiver of the
right to counsel and an election to defend pro se, the presiding judge should conduct some sort of inquiry bearing
upon the defendant's capacity to make an intelligent choice. 10 0
Although the Second Circuit does not view the foregoing colloquy
as constitutionally compelled, 10 ' there appears to be some question as to
whether post-Farettadefendants should be given notice of the right to
defend pro se equivalent to that of the right to counsel. 10 2 While Faretta
did not address itself specifically to this issue, the Court's finding that
the defendant had "clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge
that he wanted to represent himself. . . ." may be construed as obviating any requirement that notice of the right be given." 3 Such a
reading, however, tends to ignore the true import of the Farettadecision
and limits the holding unnecessarily to its facts. Assuming vis-h-vis
Faretta,that self-representation is of such a fundamental character as to
100. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
101. Id. at 276-77. While the Second Circuit requires that inquiry be made into
the competence of the pro se decision, notice of the right is not constitutionally required:
"Regardless of whether he has been notified of his right to defend himself, the criminal
defendant must make an unequivocal request to act as his own lawyer in order to invoke
the right." United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966). See Grano, supra note 3, at 1186.
102. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Annot., Duty to Advise
of Right to Counsel, 3 A.L.R. 2d 1003 (1949).
103. 422 U.S. at 835. The Court's statements may be read as adopting the Second
Circuit's requirement of an unequivocal request by the accused, in lieu of notice. See
note 101 supra. However, the requirement in Farettathat the accused must "clearly and
unequivocally" declare his pro se desires has been viewed as a means through which the
right must be asserted after being apprised of its existence. See Criminal Defendants at
the Bar, supra note 3, at 354, 358 n.145.
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be "basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, 1 4 it thereafter
becomes difficult to contend that the pro se right is transcended by that
of counsel or that notice thereof may be implied from a notice of the
right to counsel. Furthermore, if the valid waiver of a constitutional
right is to be defined as the "intentionalrelinquishment or abandonment
of a known right,"'01 5 it would seem that the accused in Faretta could

not have waived his right to defend pro se without having been informed
of its existence.' 0 6

Once the accused has knowledge of the right and has indicated the
desire to defend personally, Farettarequires the trial court to prelimi-

narily adjudicate the requests by inquiring into whether the defendant
has exercised the right "knowingly and intelligently."' 0 7 Although the
Court failed to elaborate on the precision with which this standard is to

be implemented, its reliance on Johnson v. Zerbst'0 8 and Von Moltke v.
Gillies'09 suggests somewhat alternative guidelines which have been

used to condition assertions of the pro se right upon a competent waiver
of counsel." 0 The Court in Zerbst emphasized that an intelligent
appreciation of the consequences of a waiver must "depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience and conduct of the accused." ''
104. 422 U.S. at 818.
105. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added).
106. It seems well established that a state must give the criminal defendant notice of
the right to counsel before a valid waiver of that right can be effected. See, e.g.,
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967). That notice of the right to proceed pro se
should be treated in a similar vein is evidenced by the fact that Faretla placed the right
on an independent basis, and not as a mere correlate of the right to counsel. 422 U.S.
at 819-20 n.15. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
107. 422 U.S. at 835.
108. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
109. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
110. See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text; United States v. Plattner, 330
F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
111. 304 U.S. at 464. Adherence to the Zerbst standard has prompted the California
courts to consider various factors through a "case by case" approach rather than follow
definite standards. People v. Hill, 268 Cal. App. 2d 504, 74 Cal. Rptr. 180, 185 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1968). Thus, in People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1970), the court denied the defendant's request to waive counsel, even though the
defendant was twenty-one years of age, possessed a tenth or eleventh grade education,
and had no previous experience in defending himself since he had no criminal record. Id.
at -, 464 P.2d at 69, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The cases have also required the pro se
defendant to have some ability to present his defense adequately. See People v. Sharp, 7
Cal. 3d 448, 462, 499 P.2d 489, 498, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, 242 (1972) (trial court's
discretion in basing the denial of pro se requests on the defendant's demeanor affirmed
on appeal); People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P.2d 913, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961)
(defendant's mid-trial pro se motion denied notwithstanding the fact that he understood
the nature of the charges against him); People v. Lee, 249 Cal. App. 2d 234, 57 Cal,
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Further inquiry into the Zerbst rationale, however, reveals its standard to

be of questionable value in measuring the assertion of constitutional
rights, since its focus on purely subjective factors may be employed to
severely restrict the scope of the pro se right. Hence, while the test

would provide adequate protections for those defendants in need of
counsel, its discretionary implications could be read as requiring some

sort of professional ability by the accused to represent himself, a requirement explicitly rejected by Faretta.112

Perhaps a more objective method by which to determine the
"knowing and intelligenf' character of the defendant's pro se decision is
presented in Von Moltke, where the Court commented on the duty of

the trial judge to "investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case.

demand," for

To be valid such waiver [of counsel] must be made with an
apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory of-

fenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and cir-

cumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other3 facts essential

to a broad understanding of the whole matter."
In applying these standards, the federal courts have expressed

preference for the more general Zerbst test of a knowing and intelligent
waiver, believing the Von Moltke standard to require unattainable "pro-

cedural exactitude.""1 4 However, any discontent with the latter formuRptr. 281 (Dist. CL App. 1967) (pro se request denied because the defendant knew
virtually nothing about substantive and procedural law). But see People v. Addison, 256
Cal. App. 2d 18, 63 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
112. 422 U.S. at 836. It has been suggested that both Zerbst and Von Moltke may be
read as requiring, in addition to an intelligent appreciation of the consequences of a
waiver, the ability to defend pro se. See The Right of an Accused, supra note 3, at 1139
n.40. The express rejection by Farettaof this construction of the case law necessarily
implies the adoption of language in People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 626 (Dist Ct. App. 1967), which states: "If the defendant wants to venture into
the unknown, he must be allowed to do so, if he is aware of the dangers that lurk within.
He need not demonstrate that he can meet them." Id. at -, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 629 (emphasis added). With respect to the professional capabilities required of the pro se
defendant, the court continued more specifically:
An intelligent conception of the consequences of proceeding without counsel is not negatived by a lack of knowledge of particular rules of law or procedure ...
[L]ack of knowledge of the law cannot be used as the sole basis for
saying that an attempted waiver of counsel is ineffective.
Id. at -, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30.
113. 332 U.S. at 723-24.
114. United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
930 (1970). For a comprehensive discussion of the law of waiver in the federal courts,
see Spanbauer v. Burke, 374 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 861 (1967),
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lation involves at least a partial misreading of its mandates, for the
accused need not comprehend the legal intricacies of his case in order to
satisfy the standard, but must only be made aware of the facts, charges,

possible pleas, allowable punishments, etc., involved therein to enable
him to assess the implications of proceeding pro se. n5

Furthermore,

failure by the courts to insist upon definite criterion by which to inform
the accused of matters essential to a "broad understanding" of the case

may result in a waiver of counsel without the true knowledge of its
consequences." 6 While the age, education, and mental stability of the
accused may have an indirect bearing upon whether he has "knowingly
and intelligently" exercised the right, the primary focus in such a
determination should follow more objective guidelines. The right of a

defendant to dispense with counsel should not be made to turn directly
upon such factors as his background, experience or conduct but rather
on whether the defendant is "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that. . . 'his choice
7 The principles set forth in Von Moltke
is made with eyes open.' ,,1
seem best suited to the effectuation of this design, according fundamental

protection not only to the constitutional right to counsel but to the pro se

right as well."

8

Simultaneous Representation by Counsel (Herein Standby Counsel)
While the authority of Faretta imposes on the courts the rather
tenuous task of balancing self-representation with the assistance of

counsel, perhaps this burden would be mitigated by the appointment of
where the court concluded: "It appears that the federal courts have looked to the
substance of the Von Moltke formulations, and not to its formulas." Id. at 72. It
seems, therefore, that the implementation of Von Moltke has drifted toward the Zerbst
approach, by focusing not so much on the defendant's knowledge of relevant circumstances, but on the competence, and in some cases the capabilities of the accused to
represent himself. See notes 111-12 supra and accompanying text. But see United
States ex rel. Ackerman v. Russell, 388 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1968); Shawan v. Cox, 350
F.2d 909, 912 (10th Cir. 1965).
115. 332 U.S. at 723-24. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
116. For an excellent case in point see Salazar v. Sigler, 441 F.2d 834 (8th Cir.
1971). In Sigler, a twenty-one-year-old Mexican possessing a ninth grade education was
permitted to waive counsel, and plead guilty to a charge of murder, despite the fact that
the trial court had not informed the defendant of the nature of the charges, allowable
punishments, possible defenses or circumstances in mitigation. Id. at 838-39.
117. 422 U.S. at 835.
118. It should be noted that the requirement of a competent decision by the pro se
defendant is necessarily included within the Faretta determination of whether the right
has been "knowingly and intelligently" exercised. For a method of objectively measuring Farettacompetence most effectively through the Von Moltke standard see The Right
of an Accused, supra note 3, at 1145-46.
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standby counsel to assist those defendants desirous of representing
themselves. The appointment of such counsel at the arraignment would
facilitate adherence to the somewhat burdensome Von Moltke scheme,
by providing someone other than the trial court to advise the accused

not only of the essential facts involved in the case, but also of the
desirability of legal assistance in certain matters.119 This procedure has
also been proposed in order to furnish pro se defendants with profes-

sional advocacy at trial, where counsel may, upon request, interject
procedural motions or direct and cross-examine witnesses on behalf, of
the accused.' 2
In addition, the standby device would, in many instances, generate a greater rapport between the accused and counsel,
since the defendant would be assured that the final tactical decisions at

trial would be his. 2 '
While the trial court may, in its discretion, appoint standby counsel

even over the objections of the accused,122 the weight of authority
appears to be that the pro se defendant is not entitled to the simulta-

neous assistance of counsel as a matter of right. 123 Proper analysis of
119. See Mazor, The Right to Be Provided Counsel: Variations on a Familiar
Theme, 9 UTAH L. Rnv. 50, 76 (1964).
120. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), where Chief Justice Burger
stated:
When a defendant refuses counsel... a trial court is well advised ... to have
such "standby counsel" to perform all the services a trained advocate would
perform ordinarily by examination and cross-examination of witnesses, objecting to evidence and making closing argument.
Id. at 467-68. This procedure has been further recommended by the ABA PROJEcr ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMIAL JUSTIC,

STANDARDS RELATING TO THE

FuNcTnON

OF THE TRuAL

JuDGE § 6.7 (App. Draft 1972):
When a defendant has been permitted to proceed without assistance of counsel
the trial judge should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist the
defendant when called upon and to call the judge's attention to matters favorable to the accused upon which the judge should rule on his own motion.
Standby counsel should always be appointed in cases expected to be long or
complicated or in which there are multiple defendants.
See also Kamisar & Choper, Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and
Legal Policy Observations, 48 MiNN. L. RFv. 1, 36 (1963); Note, The Representation of
Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 579, 585
(1963).
121. See note 60 supra; CriminalDefendants at the Bar, supra note 3, at 361 n.159.
122. 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46, citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67, 71 (9th Cir. 1967); Brown v.
United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959). See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467-68
(1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring); United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 (2d
Cir. 1971).
123. See, e.g., Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 927 (1969); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 920 (1958); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
346 U.S. 892 (1953), motion to vacate denied, 349 U.S. 943 (1955). But see Bayless v.

United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).
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the Farettadecision, however, seems to place standby counsel in a more
preferred constitutional light. This position inevitably hinges on whether the Court conditioned the assertion of the pro se right upon a valid
waiver of the right to counsel. The contention that Faretta's knowing
and intelligent standard referred solely to the assertion of the pro se
defense and not necessarily to a waiver of counsel is supported by the
fact that the Court found the right to be independent of the right to
24
counsel clause of the sixth amendment and not as a correlate thereof.1
Furthermore, evaluation of the Faretta"dichotomy" of interests pervading the origins of the right serves to reinforce the conclusion that due
process permits and perhaps even requires the appointment of standby
counsel in cases involving pro se applicants. 125 Thus, its use by the
courts would minimize the interference with the accused's freedom of
choice in defending himself, while concomitantly promoting the fair
trial-truth determining process by providing the accused with professional assistance if he so desires. 1 6
Although Faretta did not explicitly direct the usage of standby
counsel, nevertheless the case demonstrates a rationale into which the
simultaneous representation by counsel may be neatly placed. To the
extent that this procedure is of benefit to a pro se litigant then, the
appointment of standby counsel should be encouraged.
B.

INTEREST IN THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Assertions of the Right During Trial

Although the pre-trial assertion of the right to self-representation
commands only that the defendant possess an intelligent appreciation of
its consequences, there appear to be additional considerations relating to
the efficient and orderly administration of justice which inhibit assertions of the right during trial.'2 7 Deference to these considerations has
prompted the general belief by the courts that although the right is
constitutionally compelling if asserted prior to trial, its attempted exercise subsequent to that time may be subjected to the discretion of the
124. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text; Criminal Defendants at the Bar,
supra note 3, at 354.
125. See notes 61-93 supra and accompanying text; Criminal Defendants at the Bar,
supra note 3, at 361.
126. See notes 82-93 supra and accompanying text.
127. Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
911 (1959). See Grano, supra note 3, at 1178, 1182-84; The Right of an Accused,
supranote 3, at 1137.
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trial courts. 1 28 Accordingly, the standard of review used in reconciling
the individual's pro se interests with those of social expedience has been
typically illustrated by the Second Circuit in United States ex. rel.
29
Maldonadov. Denno:1
There must be a showing [by the accused] that the prejudice
to the legitimate interests of the defendant overbalances the
potential disruption of proceedings already in progress, with
given to the trial judge's assessconsiderable weight being
30
ment of this balance.1
Thus where mid-trial motions to dispense with counsel have potentially
threatened to complicate the orderly procedures of the court, 3 ' or
unavoidably delay the proceedings, 3 2 the courts have denied the requests.
While Farettahad no reason to consider the issue of whether the
pro se right permeates the entire trial, its principles should substantially
outweigh the continued adherence to the "potential disruption" rationale
by increasing significantly the defendant's interest in proceeding pro se.
Indeed, the Court's implicit rejection of the discretionary standard may
be countenanced by the fact that the possibility of complication and
delay, which the Denno test finds disdainful during trial, appears just as
ubiquitous when the right is asserted precedent to trial."'s It would
therefore seem that the only disruption occasioned by the assertion of
the pro se right during trial would be the continuance required by
Faretta to determine whether the accused had exercised the right
13 4
"knowingly and intelligently."'
128. E.g., United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel.
Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007
(1966); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963); Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375

U.S. 838 (1963).
129. 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
130. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the variations of the "potential
disruption" interests which have restricted the exercise of the right during trial see

Grano, supra note 3, at 1181-84.
131. See United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963); Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 838 (1963); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on
other grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
132. See United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C.
Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
133. See Grano, supra note 3, at 1183-84.
134. See note 107 supra.
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Terminationof the Right
In spite of the fact that the Farettaliberalization of self-representa-

tion serves to diminish, to some extent, interests in the orderly processes
of justice, circumstances of misconduct by pro se litigants may provide
sufficient reason to terminate the right.' 8 , Thus, in Illinois v. Allen, 180

the defendant was initially permitted to represent himself, although
during the voir dire he "started to argue with the judge in a most abusive

manner." The court immediately forewarned the defendant and instructed standby counsel to continue the proceedings, whereupon the
defendant renewed the abusive threats to the judge and attempted to

destroy papers belonging to counsel. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the defendant's removal from the courtroom.1 3 7

The United

States Supreme Court in Allen affirmed the trial court's conviction of
the defendant, holding that in circumstances where the accused mani-

fests behavior which is "so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of
the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom,"

the right to be present at trial and its concomitant pro se right may be
appropriately terminated. 3
While the Allen decision is usually represented as disclosing the

periphery of the sixth amendment right to be present at trial, considered
treatment of the Farettarationale warrants the contention that the pro
se right should be viewed in a similar vein. 13 As a result, courts should

distinguish the various degrees of misconduct which sometimes accompany pro se representation, only one of which should involve the termination of the right. The Allen situation, of course, is the most extreme,
where the disruptions are sufficiently great as to be considered intolera-

ble. However, this circumstance is to be contrasted to situations where
misconduct is tolerable.' 40 The distinction which should be drawn
135.
136.
137.
(1967).
138.

See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-27 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, 2, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907

397 U.S. at 343. The Court further stated:
It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity,
order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country.
The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted
with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.

Id.
139. See notes 51-59 supra and accompanying text; Self-Representation in Criminal
Trials, supra note 3, at 1493.
140. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). The Allen test of toleranceintolerance seems to be whether the disruption is such that the trial cannot possibly
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between the two is dependent upon the effectiveness of alternative
judicial sanctions which may be available to the courts. In circumstances similar to Allen, where notice of impropriety and the contempt
device will likely achieve little, termination of the pro se right is in
order. 141 It has been suggested, however, that many misconduct situations involve serious pro se litigants forcefully advocating claims and
defenses as vehemently as the courts will allow.' 42 To the extent that
warnings to defendants and the contempt procedure in more extreme
cases will remedy any disruption extending beyond the Allen periphery,
the defendant's behavior should be considered tolerable, with the pro se
right thus protected.
V.

CONCLUSION

The pro se issues pervading the Faretta appeal presented the
Supreme Court with the typical task of reconciling conflicting constitutional values-values which are inherent in due process as it relates to
the right to counsel and the progeny which it inevitably produced. By
way of traditional argument for the assistance of counsel, these values
consisted, on the one hand, of societal interests demanding the proper
administration of justice by maximizing, as much as possible, the reliability of the guilt-determining process. Opposite the collective social
interests existed values seeking to preserve respect for the dignity and
autonomy of the individual by giving the criminal defendant the prerogative of freedom of choice in selecting methods through which to defend
against the potential deprivation of liberty by state authority. By
recognizing the constitutional right of self-representation, the Faretta
Court balanced the opposing ends of due process, thereby accommodating the less substantial interest to the other. Through the utilization of
the Supreme Courts traditional accommodation process, protection was
afforded both interests involved, first by acknowledging the individual
pro se interest as fundamental, but by subsequently qualifying that
interest through the continued deference to the objectives of truth at
trial. Thus, the criminal defendant may represent himself at trial, but
the assertion of the right is conditioned upon a knowing and intelligent
decision to forego counsel and proceed alone.
proceed with the defendant's presence. Id. at 343. See Criminal Defendants at the Bar,
supra note 3, at 363.
141. For a discussion of the appropriate use of judicial sanctions, specifically the
propriety of the contempt procedure, see Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). See
also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
142. Self-Representation in Criminal Trials, supra note 3, at 1494.
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The Farettaframework, however, is susceptible to an adjudication
process other than that of accommodation, namely, resolution of the
conflict without the compromise of otherwise antithetical constitutional
values. Toward this end, perhaps the opposing interests of due process
can best be resolved through both pro se representation and the simultaneous assistance of counsel. Certainly, the judicial appointment of
standby counsel would assuage the traditional demands of the right-tocounsel cases, yet it would also meet the requirements of Faretta by
permitting the criminal defendant to engage in the decision-making
processes relating to his defense. Although the construction of the
Faretta decision must remain for the future academics of the lower
courts, the resolution of procedural complexities affecting the implementation of the pro se right is dependent, to a great extent, on the selection
by the courts of either the accommodation process or that of judicial
resolution.
James D. Hurley
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